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Abstract—It is known that attackers can exfiltrate data from
air-gapped computers through their speakers via sonic and
ultrasonic waves. To eliminate the threat of such acoustic covert
channels in sensitive systems, audio hardware can be disabled and
the use of loudspeakers can be strictly forbidden. Such audio-less
systems are considered to be audio-gapped, and hence immune
to acoustic covert channels.
In this paper, we introduce a technique that enable attackers
leak data acoustically from air-gapped and audio-gapped systems.
Our developed malware can exploit the computer power supply
unit (PSU) to play sounds and use it as an out-of-band, secondary
speaker with limited capabilities. The malicious code manipulates
the internal switching frequency of the power supply and hence
controls the sound waveforms generated from its capacitors and
transformers. Our technique enables producing audio tones in
a frequency band of 0-24khz and playing audio streams (e.g.,
WAV) from a computer power supply without the need for audio
hardware or speakers. Binary data (files, keylogging, encryption
keys, etc.) can be modulated over the acoustic signals and sent
to a nearby receiver (e.g., smartphone). We show that our
technique works with various types of systems: PC workstations
and servers, as well as embedded systems and IoT devices that
have no audio hardware at all. We provide technical background
and discuss implementation details such as signal generation and
data modulation. We show that the POWER-SUPPLaY code can
operate from an ordinary user-mode process and doesn’t need
any hardware access or special privileges. Our evaluation shows
that using POWER-SUPPLaY, sensitive data can be exfiltrated
from air-gapped and audio-gapped systems from a distance of
five meters away at a maximal bit rates of 50 bit/sec.
I. INTRODUCTION
Air-gapped computers are kept isolated from the Internet or
other less secure networks. Such isolation is often enforced
when sensitive or confidential data is involved, in order to
reduce the risk of data leakage. Military networks such as
the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
(JWICS) [1], as well as networks within financial organiza-
tions, critical infrastructure, and commercial industries [2],
[3], are known to be air-gapped due to the sensitive data they
handle.
Despite the high degree of isolation, even air-gapped net-
works can be breached using complex attack vectors such
as supply chain attacks, malicious insiders, and deceived
insiders. Famous air-gap breaching cases include Stuxnet [4]
and Agent.BTZ [5], but other incidents have also been reported
[6], [7]. In 2018, The US Department of Homeland Security
accused Russian government hackers of penetrating America’s
power utilities [8]. Due to reports in the Washington Post
in November 2019, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India
Limited (NPCIL) confirmed that the Kudankulam Nuclear
Power Plant suffered a cyber-attack earlier that year [9].
A. Air-Gap Covert Channels
While the infiltration of such networks has been shown to be
feasible, the exfiltration of data from non-networked computers
or those without physical access is considered a challenging
task. Over the years, different types of out-of-band covert
channels have been proposed, exploring the feasibility of data
exfiltration through an air-gap. Electromagnetic methods that
exploit electromagnetic radiation from different components
of the computer are likely the oldest kind of air-gap covert
channel researched [10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. Other types of
optical [15], [16] and thermal [17] out-of-band channels have
also been studied. Acoustic exfiltration of data using inaudible
sound has also been explored in many studies [18], [19], [20],
[21]. The existing acoustic methods suggest transmitting data
through the air-gap via high frequency sound waves generated
by computer loudspeakers. Note that existing acoustic covert
channels rely on the presence of audio hardware and loud-
speakers in the compromised computer.
B. Audio-Gap: Speaker-less, Audio-less Systems
To cope with acoustic covert channels, common practices
and security policies strictly prohibit the use of speakers on
sensitive computers, in order to create a so-called ’audio-
gapped’ environment [22], [23]. As an additional defensive
measure, the audio chip may be disabled in the UEFI/BIOS
to cope with the accidental attachment of loudspeakers to the
line-out connectors. Obviously, disabling the audio hardware
and keeping speakers disconnected from computers can effec-
tively mitigate the acoustic covert channels presented thus far
[24].
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C. Our Contribution
In this paper, we introduce a new acoustic channel which
doesn’t require speakers or other audio related hardware. We
show that malware running on a PC can exploit its power
supply unit (PSU) and use it as an out-of-band speaker with
limited capabilities. The malicious code intentionally manipu-
lates the internal switching frequency of the power supply and
hence controls the waveform generated from its capacitors and
transformers. This technique enables playing audio streams
from a computer even when audio hardware is disabled and
speakers are not present. We show that our technique works
with various types of systems: PC workstations and servers,
as well as embedded systems and IoT devices that have no
audio hardware. Binary data can be modulated and transmitted
out via the acoustic signals. The acoustic signals can then be
intercepted by a nearby receiver (e.g., a smartphone), which
demodulates and decodes the data and sends it to the attacker
via the Internet.
The proposed method has the following unique characteris-
tics:
• Requires no audio hardware. The method allows mal-
ware to play audible and inaudible sounds from systems
which are completely audio-gapped (e.g., speakers are
disconnected) or systems that doesn’t have any type of
audio hardware (e.g., embedded devices).
• Requires no special privileges. The method doesn’t
require special privileges or access to hardware resources.
The transmitting code can be initiated from an ordinary
user-space process and is highly evasive.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The attack
model is discussed in Section II. Related work is presented
in Section III. Background on the power supply acoustics is
provided in Section IV. Section V and Section VII, respec-
tively, contain details on The transmitter and receiver. Section
VIII describes the analysis and evaluation. Countermeasures
are discussed in Section IX. We conclude in Section X.
II. ATTACK MODEL
The capability of generating acoustic tones through power
supplies can be considered a general contribution to the field
of acoustic covert channels, regardless of its connection to
the air-gap. However, in this paper, we investigate it as a
method of exfiltrating information from air-gapped, audio-
gapped systems. Similar to other covert communication chan-
nels, the adversarial attack model consists of a transmitter and
a receiver. Typically in such scenarios, the transmitter is a
computer, and the receiver is a nearby mobile phone belonging
to an employee or visitor (Figure 1).
1) Infection phase: In a preliminary stage, the transmitter
and receiver are compromised by the attacker. Infecting highly
secure networks can be accomplished, as demonstrated by the
attacks involving Stuxnet [4] and Agent.Btz [5], and other
attacks [25], [6], [7]. In our case, the infected computer must
be equipped with an internal power supply which exists in
virtually every computerized system today. In addition, the
A
B
Fig. 1: Exfiltration scenario: malware within the infected air-
gapped, audio-gapped (speaker-less) computer (A) leaks a
file through inaudible sound waves played through the power
supply. The file is received by a nearby smartphone (B).
mobile phones of employees are identified, possibly by social
engineering techniques. The employees are assumed to carry
their mobile phones around the workplace. These devices are
then infected, either online, by exploiting a device’s vulnerabil-
ities, or by physical contact when possible. Infecting a mobile
phone can be accomplished via different attack vectors, using
emails, SMS/MMS, malicious apps, malicious websites, and
so on [26], [27], [28], [29], [30].
2) Exfiltration phase: In the exfiltration phase, the malware
in the compromised computer gathers sensitive data of interest.
The data can be files, keystroke logging, credentials (e.g.,
passwords), or encryption keys. The malware then modulates
and transmits the data using the acoustic sound waves emitted
from the computer’s power supply (Figure 2). A nearby
infected mobile phone detects the transmission, demodulates
and decodes the data, and transfers it to the attacker via
the Internet using mobile data or Wi-Fi. Note that in this
paper, we demonstrate the attack model using a mobile phone
receiver, a device which is commonly located in the vicinity
of a computer. Other types of receivers are devices with
internal or external microphones such as laptops and desktop
workstations.
III. RELATED WORK
Covert channels in networked environments have been
widely discussed in professional literature for years [31], [32],
[33]. In these covert channels, attackers may hide data within
existing network protocols (such as HTTPS, SMTP and DNS),
conceal data within images (stenography), encode it in packet
timings and so on.
Our work focuses on the challenge of leaking data from
computers that have no network connectivity (air-gapped com-
puters). Over the years different types of out-of-band covert
channels have been proposed, allowing the attacker to bridge
the air-gap isolation. The methods can be mainly catego-
rized into electromagnetic and magnetic, optical, thermal, and
acoustic covert channels.
Electromagnetic emissions are probably the oldest type of
methods that have been explored academically with regard to
air-gap communication. In a pioneer work in this field, Kuhn
Fig. 2: The information has been exfiltrated via covert ultra-
sonic sound signals played from the power supply. As can be
seen in the spectrogram, four different frequencies are used
for modulation.
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Fig. 3: Part of the song ’Happy Birthday’ as played through
the power supply.
and Anderson [11] discuss hidden data transmission using
electromagnetic emissions from video cards. Back in 2001,
Thiele [34] utilized the computer monitor to transmit radio
signals to a nearby AM radio receiver. AirHopper malware
[10], [2] introduced in 2014 by Guri et al, exploits video card
emissions to bridge the air-gap between isolated computers
and nearby mobile phones via FM radio signals. In a similar
manner, GSMem [14], Funthenna [35] and USBee [36], intro-
duce attack scenarios in which attackers use different sources
of electromagnetic radiation on a computer’s motherboard, as
covert exfiltration channels. More recently, Guri et al proposed
using the low-frequency magnetic fields emitted from the
computer CPU for covert data exfiltration in order to leak
TABLE I: Summary of existing air-gap covert channels
Type Method
Electromagnetic
AirHopper [10], [2] (FM radio)
GSMem [14] (cellular frequencies)
USBee [36] (USB bus emission)
Funthenna [35] (GPIO emission)
PowerHammer (power lines) [39]
Magnetic
MAGNETO [38] (CPU-generated
magnetic fields)
ODINI [37] (Faraday shields bypass)
Acoustic
Ultrasonic (speaker-to-mic) [18], [45]
MOSQUITO [21] (speaker-to-speaker)
Fansmitter [46] (fans noise)
DiskFiltration [47] (hard disk noise)
Thermal BitWhisper [17] (heat emission)
Optical
LED-it-GO [16] (hard drive LED)
VisiSploit [43] (invisible pixels)
Fast blinking images [44]
Keyboard LEDs [15]
CTRL-ALT-LED: keyboard LEDs [40]
Router LEDs [41]
aIR-Jumper [42] (Infrared, security cameras)
Vibrations (Seismic) AiR-ViBeR [48] (Surface vibrations)
data from Faraday caged air-gapped computers [37], [38]. In
2018, Guri et al also introduced PowerHammer, a method
in which malware on air-gapped computers exfiltrates data
through the main power lines using conducted emissions [39].
Several studies have proposed the use of optical emanation
for air-gap communication. In 2002, Loughry and Umphress
proposed the exfiltration of data by blinking the LEDs on
the PC keyboard [15]. in 2019, Guri et al presented CTRL-
ALT-LED, a malware which can exfiltrate data from an air-
gapped computer via the keyboard LEDs of modern USB
keyboards [40]. In 2016, Shamir et al demonstrated how to
establish a covert channel through the air-gap using a malware,
remote lasers, and scanners [23]. Guri et al also presented
covert channels that use the hard drive indicator LED [16],
the router LEDs [41], and security camera IR LEDs [42] to
leak data from air-gapped networks. VisiSploit [43] is another
optical covert channel in which data is leaked through a hidden
image projected on an LCD screen. Guri also showed how
to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers via fast blinking
images [44]. BitWhisper [17] is a thermal based covert channel
which enables covert communication between two adjacent
air-gapped computers via the exchange of so-called ’thermal-
pings.’
In acoustic covert channels, data is transmitted via audible
or inaudible sound waves. In 2005, Madhavapeddy et al [20]
discuss ’audio networking,’ which allows data transmission be-
tween a pair of desktop computers, using off-the-shelf speakers
and a microphone. In 2013, Hanspach and Goetz [18] extended
this method for near-ultrasonic covert networking between
air-gapped laptops using built-in speakers and microphones.
They created a mesh network and used it to implement an
air-gapped key-logger which demonstrates the covert chan-
nel. The concept of communicating over inaudible sounds
has been extended for different scenarios using laptops and
smartphones [19]. In 2018, researchers presented MOSQUITO
[21], a covert communication channel between two air-gapped
computers (without microphones) via so-called ’speaker-to-
speaker’ communication. In 2020, researcher presented a new
type of vibrational (seismic) covert channel dubbed AiR-
ViBeR. In this technique, data is modulated in unnoticeable
vibrations generated by the computer fans. The vibrations
can be received and decoded by nearby smartphones via the
integrated, sensitive accelerometers.
A. Speaker-less Methods
All of the acoustic methods described above require the
presence of external or internal speakers in the transmitting
computer. This is considered a restrictive requirement, since
loudspeakers are commonly forbidden in air-gapped computers
[24], [22]. The elimination of loudspeakers is the most effec-
tive defense against the speaker-to-microphone and speaker-
to-speaker covert channels discussed above [49].
In 2016, Guri et al presented DiskFiltration, a method
that uses the acoustic signals emitted from the hard disk
drive (HDD) to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers
[47]. Although this method doesn’t need a speaker, it is
limited in terms of distance (up to two meters), and it doesn’t
work on newer technologies such as solid-state drives (SSDs).
In 2016, Guri et al also introduced Fansmitter, malware
which facilitates the exfiltration of data from an air-gapped
computer via noise intentionally emitted from PC fans [46].
In this method, the transmitting computer does not need to
be equipped with audio hardware or an internal or external
speaker. This method uses the internal fans, that exist in most
laptops, desktops and server computers, and it is effective for
longer distances of 6-7 meters and more. POWER-SUPPLaY
differs from DiskFiltration and Fansmitter methods in two
aspects. First, it uses only basic CPU instructions and does
not use system resources like the HDD (DiskFiltration) or
fans (Fansmitter). This makes it difficult for detection systems
to identify the malicious activity of the transmitter. Second,
POWER-SUPPLaY can operate at bit rates of 50 bit/sec which
is much faster than Fansmitter (1 bit/sec) and DiskFiltration
(3 bit/sec). In addition, POWER-SUPPLaY has the flexibility
of generating acoustic tones in the 0-24 kHz frequency band,
which implies that it is capable of generating both audible and
inaudible sounds. Figure 3 shows the spectrogram of a part of
the song ’Happy Birthday’ as played form the power supply
using the POWER-SUPPLaY technique.
Table 1 summarizes the existing covert channels for air-
gapped computers.
IV. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
In this section we provide the technical background on
switch-mode power supplies (SMPSs), discuss the acoustic
Vibrations
Capacitor
Fig. 4: Illustration of the singing capacitor phenomenon
emission of SMPSs and describe the signal generation.
A. Switch-Mode Power Supplies
Computers consume power using their power supplies.
Modern SMPS are used in all types of electronic equipment
today, including computers, TVs, printers, Internet of Things
(IoT) and embedded devices, and cell phone chargers. The
advantages of SMPSs over the older linear power supplies
include their higher efficiency, smaller size, and lighter weight.
An in-depth discussion on the design of SMPSs is beyond
the scope of this paper, and we refer the interested reader to
handbooks on this topic [50]. Briefly, an SMPS transfers power
from a 220V AC source to several DC loads while converting
voltage and current characteristics. In the SMPS, the AC power
passes through fuses and a line filter, and is then rectified by
a full-wave bridge rectifier. The rectified voltage is applied to
the power factor correction module and regulated via DC to
DC converters.
B. SMPS Acoustic Emission
The DC supply from a rectifier or battery is fed to the
inverter where it is turned on and off at high rates by the
switching MOSFET or power transistors. This switching rate
is also known as the switching frequency of the SMPS. The
typical switching frequency of a computer power supply is
between 20 kHz and 20 MHz.
The switching frequency affects, among others components
in the SMPS, the transformers and capacitors. These are the
primary sources of the acoustic noise generated by the SMPS.
• Transformers’ Audible Noise. Transformers produce au-
dible noise, since they contain many physically movable
elements, such as coils, isolation tapes, and bobbins. The
current in the coils, which occurs at the switching fre-
quency, produces electromagnetic fields which generate
repulsive and/or attractive forces between the coils. This
can produce a mechanical vibration in the coils, ferrite
cores, or isolation tapes.
• Capacitors Audible Noise. Ceramic capacitors can pro-
duce audible noise, since they have Piezoelectric char-
acteristics. The Piezoelectric acoustic effect on the ca-
pacitor is commonly described as ”singing capacitors”.
This noise is actually the result of vibrations of the
capacitor on the Printed Circuit Board (PCB) that occur
in normal working conditions. These vibrations causes
capacitor displacement, as shown in Figure 4. The fre-
quency and amplitude of the displacement determine the
acoustic waveform generated from the capacitors. When
the vibration frequency occurs within the audible range,
approximately 20 Hz 20 kHz, it may also be heard as an
audible hum. The range between 20 kHz and 24 kHz is
considered as ’near-ultrasonic’ and can not be heard by
most humans.
The typical switching frequency of SMPS during its normal
operation is within the range of 20kHz-20MHz. Thus, the
acoustic signal generated by SMPS is mainly in a frequency
range of 20kHz and higher. This range is at the upper bound
of human hearing and considered inaudible to adult humans.
V. TRANSMISSION
A. Signal Generation
Since modern CPUs are energy efficient, the momentary
workload of the CPU directly affects the dynamic changes in
its power consumption [51]. By regulating the workload of the
CPU, it is possible to govern its power consumption, and hence
control the momentary switching frequency of the SMPS. By
intentionally starting and stopping the CPU workload, we are
able to set the SMPS so it switches at a specified frequency
and hence emit an acoustic signal and modulate binary data
over it.
To generate a switching frequency fc, we control the
utilization of the CPU at a frequency correlated to fc. To
that end, n worker threads are created where each thread is
bound to a specific core. To generate the carrier wave, each
worker thread overloads its core at a frequency fc repeatedly
alternating between applying a continuous workload on its
core for a time period of 1/2fc and putting its core in an
idle state for a time period of 1/2fc.
Algorithm 1 transmit (cores, freq, time)
1: pthread barrier init(&halfCycleBarrierHI,NULL, cores)
2: pthread barrier init(&halfCycleBarrierLO,NULL, cores)
3: for i← 1 to cores do
4: threadCreate(worker)
5: end for
6: end = clock gettime() + time
7: halfCycleNano ← 0.5 ∗
NANO PER SECOND/freq
8: cycleNano← NANO PER SECOND/freq
9: while clock gettime() < end do
10: LO ← 0
11: pthread barrier wait(&halfCycleBarrierLO)
12: while clock gettime()%cycleNano <
halfCycleNano do
13: end while
14: LO ← 1
15: pthread barrier wait(&halfCycleBarrierHI)
16: while clock gettime()%cycleNano >=
halfCycleNano do
17: end while
18: end while
Algorithms 1 shows the generation of acoustic tone (freq)
for a time duration of (time) milliseconds, using (nCores)
Algorithm 2 worker (threadState)
1: while true do
2: //sync threads on end of LO half cycle
3: pthread barrier wait(&halfCycleBarrierLO)
4: //HI half cycle − busy loop
5: while !LO do
6: end while
7: //sync threads on end of HI half cycle
8: pthread barrier wait(&halfCycleBarrierHI)
9: end while
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Fig. 5: n cores utilization during a transmission
cores. At the beginning we initiate (nCores) threads and
bound each thread to a specific core. The switching frequency
is generated by each worker thread by employing busy loops
and barrier objects. We overload the core using the busy
waiting technique. This causes full utilization of the core for
the time period and returns. The worker threads are synchro-
nized with barrier objects, allowing them to start and stop
the switching frequency altogether. The main thread governs
the synchronization of the worker threads, changing the cycle
state flag according to the barrier timing. This ensures that
the generation of the duty cycles are precisely timed between
the cores. Figure 5 illustrates the cores’ utilization during the
generation of a carrier wave fc. Note that the power of the
generated signal is correlated to the number of cores that
participate in the transmission. The utilization of more cores
yields more power consumption and hence more ’dancing
capacitors’.
Based on the algorithm above, we implemented a trans-
mitter for Linux Ubuntu (version 16.04, 64 bit). We
used the sched setaffinity system call to bind each
thread to a CPU core. The affinity is the thread level
attribute that is configured independently for each worker
thread. To synchronize the initiation and termination of the
worker threads, we used the thread barrier objects with
pthread_barrier_wait() [52]. Note that the precision
of sleep() is is not sufficient for our needs given the
frequencies of the carrier waves which are at 24kHz or lower.
Power SupplyCPU Switching 
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Fig. 6: The signal generation
Cores 1-4
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Fig. 7: Spectrogram of the FSK modulation. The acousti
signals generated from the PC power supply.
B. Data Transfer
The acoustic signal can be used to carry digital information
using modulation schemes. For the data transfer we used the
Frequency-Shift Keying (FSK) and the more advanced Orthog-
onal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) modulation
schemes.
1) Frequency-Shift Keying: In frequency-shift keying
(FSK) the data is represented by a change in the frequency of
a carrier wave. Recall that the transmitting code can determine
the frequency of the generated signal. In FSK, each frequency
represents a different symbol.
Figure 6 illustrates the generation of FSK signals. In this
case, n threads are bounded to the CPU cores. All threads
are transmitting in the same carrier at given time, and hence
generating a distinct switching frequency for each symbol.
The generates acoustic tone is correlated with this switching
frequency.
Figure 7 shows the time-frequency spectrogram of a binary
sequence (’010101010’) modulated with two frequency FSK
(B-FSK) as transmitted from a PC with four cores. In this
modulation, the frequencies 8500Hz and 8750Hz have been
used to encode the symbols ’0’, ’1’, respectively.
2) Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing: We de-
veloped a fine-grained approach, in which we control the
workload of each of the CPU cores independently from the
other cores. Regulating the workload of each core separately
enables greater control of the momentary switching frequency.
By controlling the workload of each core separately, we can
use a different sub-carrier for each transmitting core. This
allows us to employ a more efficient modulation scheme such
as orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM).
In orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing data is repre-
sented by multiple carrier frequencies in parallel. In our case,
we use different cores to transmit data in different sub-carriers.
In each sub-carrier, we used on-off keying (OOK) to modulate
the data. Note that since the sub-carriers’ signals are generated
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Fig. 9: Spectrogram of the OFDM modulation
in parallel, the maximal number of sub-carriers is equal to the
number of cores available for the transmissions.
Figure 8 illustrates the generation of OFDM signals. In this
case, 4 threads are bounded to the 4 CPU cores. Each thread
transmits in different sub-carrier, and hence generates different
switching frequency. The acoustic tone is compound from all
the switching frequencies generated by the sub-carriers.
Figure 9 presents a binary sequence modulated with OFDM
with four sub-carriers as transmitted from a PC with four
cores. In this modulation, 8000Hz (core 1), 8200Hz (core
2), 8400Hz (core 3) and 8600Hz (core 4) have been used to
encode the symbols ’00’, ’01’, ’10’ and ’11’, respectively.
C. Transmission Protocol
We transmit the data in small packets composed of a
preamble, a payload, and a cyclic redundancy check (CRC)
code.
• Preamble. A preamble header is transmitted at the be-
ginning of every packet. It consists of a sequence of eight
alternating bits (’10101010’) which helps the receiver
determine the carrier wave frequency and amplitude. In
addition, the preamble allows the receiver to detect the
beginning of a transmission. Note that in our covert
channel the amplitude of the carrier wave is unknown
to the receiver in advance, and it mainly depends on
what type of transmitting computer is used, the num-
ber of cores participating in the transmission, and the
distance between the transmitter and the receiver. These
parameters are synchronized with the receiver during the
preamble.
Fig. 10: Spectrogram of a frame modulated with B-FSK as
transmitted from a PC power supply
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Fig. 11: Spectrogram of a frame modulated with B-FSK as
transmitted from a PC power supply
• Payload. The payload is the raw data to be transmitted.
In our case, we arbitrarily choose 32 bits as the payload
size.
• CRC. For error detection, an eight bit CRC (cyclic
redundancy check) is added to the end of the frame.
The receiver calculates the CRC for the received payload,
and if it differs from the received CRC bit, an error is
detected. A spectrogram of a full frame transmitted from
a computer is presented in Figure 11. In this case, a B-
FSK was used with frequencies of 8400Hz and 8600Hz.
VI. AUDIO FORMATS
We implemented a program which plays digital audio
streams through the power supply. Our implementation sup-
ports the Waveform Audio File (WAV) format. The most com-
mon WAV format encodes uncompressed audio in pulse code
modulation (PCM). There are two fundamental parameters
which should be considered when playing audio streams: the
sample rate and the bit depth. We briefly discuss each with
regard to playing audio through the power supply.
A. Sample Rate
The sampling rate (measured in kHz) of an audio file is the
number of samples of audio carried per second. According
to the Nyquist Theorem, the maximum frequency that can
be represented in an audio file is half of the sample rate.
Most sound cards can play audio streams at 48kHz, which
is the sample rate used for DVDs. In the case of SMPS,
the maximum playing frequency depends on the maximum
rate at which we can start and stop utilizing the CPU cores,
which directly affects the SMPS switching frequency. Using
the barriers and busy loop technique described above, we could
switch each CPU core at 100kHz, and hence are capable of
playing audio streams at lower rates of 48kHz.
B. Bit Depth
In digital audio the bit-depth represents the number of
possible amplitude values for a sample. The amplitude of
each sample is encoded by the number of bits, which is the
bit depth of the audio stream. In standard sound cards, the
amplitude of a sample is sent to the digital-to-analog converter
(DAC) component and played through the loudspeakers. The
loudspeakers’ membranes vibrate in a power correlated to the
amplitude that produces the desired signal. In the case of
SMPS, the amplitude of the signal generated from the ca-
pacitors is constant and produces square acoustic waves. This
represents a simple audio stream with a depth of only 1-bit
(signal/no-signal). In order to play complex audio streams with
a wider bit depth, we implemented two different modulation
techniques; (1) amplitude modulation (AM), and (2) pulse
width modulation (PWM).
1) Amplitude Modulation: As described in the signal gener-
ation section, the number of cores used for signal generation
affects the strength of the signal. This is because the more
cores that are utilized, the more capacitors and transformers
that are switched in the SMPS. This enables some control
of the amplitude generated for each sample. Given N virtual
cores, it is possible to play each sample at N different
amplitudes and hence play audio streams with a bit depth of
roughly N . Figure 12 shows the waveform of a signal with
three amplitudes generated with the AM technique. In this
case, the signal is generated using four, two and one cores.
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Fig. 12: Three amplitudes generated with the AM technique
2) Pulse Width Modulation: PWM is a method of reduc-
ing the average power delivered by an electrical signal, by
effectively breaking it into discrete parts. The average value
Busy 
loop
Busy 
loop
75% 25%
Fig. 13: Illustration of a PWM modulated signal
of voltage (and current) fed to the load is controlled by turning
the switch between the supply and load on and off at a fast
rate. The longer the switch is on compared to the time it is
off, the greater the total amount of power supplied to the load.
By carefully timing a short pulse (i.e., going from one
output level to the other and back), the end result corresponds
to intermediate sound levels, functioning as a crude DAC.
PWM allows an approximate playback of WAV and PCM
audio.
The sound level of a sample is determined by the duration
of the CPU utilization. This is the duty cycle of the signal.
A short duty cycle corresponds to low power (low volume),
because the power is off for most of the time, while a long duty
cycle corresponds to high power (high volume). We calculate
the duty cycle required for each sample given its amplitude
value. Figure 13 illustrates a signal generated with a duty
cycle of 75% which implies a signal which is 25% stronger
than an average signal in the stream. Figure 14 contains the
spectrogram of a signal with eight decreasing amplitudes,
generated with the PWM technique. In this case, the signal is
generated using eight duty cycles which decrease over time.
Fig. 14: Eight levels of sound using the PWM technique
C. Play WAV via Power-Supply
Based on the AM and PWM techniques described above,
we implemented a program which plays PCM and WAV
files through the power supply. Our PowerSupplay [AM
| PWM] wav_file.wav program determines which type
of modulation to use and plays the wav file using the corre-
sponding technique.
VII. RECEPTION
We implemented a receiver as an app for the Android
OS. The main functionality of the receiver is (1) sampling
the signal, (2) performing signal processing, (3) detecting
the preamble header, (4) demodulating the payload, and (5)
handling errors.
The main functionality of the receiver is run in a separate
thread. It is responsible for data sampling, signal processing,
and data demodulation. An outline of the receiver is presented
in Algorithm 1; this is followed by a description.
Algorithm 1
1: procedure RECEIVER
2: raw signal = sample(44.1kHz)
3: signal = FFT (raw signal)
4: if (state == PREAMBLE) then
5: if (DetectPreamble(signal) == true) then
6: T, f0, f1 = ExtractChannelParams(signal)
7: SetState(DEMODULATE)
8: end if
9: end if
10: if (state == DEMODULATE) then
11: bit = Demodulate(signal)
12: data.add(bit)
13: if (data.size%(32 + 8) == 0) then
14: SetState(PREAMBLE)
15: end if
16: if (SignalLost(signal) then
17: SetState(PREAMBLE)
18: end if
19: end if
20: end procedure
1) Signal Sampling and Downsampling: In order to analyze
the waveforms in the frequency domain, we record data at a
rate of 44.1kHz and save it to a temporary buffer.
2) Signal Processing: The first step is to measure the
signal and transfer it to the frequency domain. This step
includes performing a fast Fourier transform (FFT) on the
sampled signal. The signal measured is stored in a buffer after
applying a filter for noise mitigation. This data is used later
in the demodulation routines. The noise mitigation function is
applied to the current sample by averaging it with the last w
samples.
3) Preamble Detection: In the PREAMBLE state the
receiver searches for a preamble sequence to identify a frame
header (lines 5-8). If the preamble sequence ’10101010’ is
detected, the state is changed to DEMODULATE to initiate
the demodulation process. Based on the preamble sequence,
the receiver determines the channel parameters, signal time,
(T ) and frequencies f0 and f1.
4) Demodulation: In the DEMODULATE state the pay-
load is demodulated given the signal parameters retrieved in
the PREAMBLE state. The demodulated bit is added to the
current payload. When the payload of 32 bits and the 8-bit
CRC are received, the algorithm returns back to the preamble
detection state (PREAMBLE).
5) Error Handling: The SignalLost() function returns true
if, during the data reception, the signal power measured in
Fig. 15: The raw signal and the demodulated bits
the carrier frequency is weaker than the amplitude of the
’0’s from the preamble for three seconds straight. In this
case, any partially received data is discarded, and the function
returns to the PREAMBLE state. Signal loss may occur if
the malware stops the transmission (e.g., for stealth or due
to the computer shutting down). Signal loss may also occur
if the receiving smartphone has been moved away from the
transmitting computer.
The demodulation is depicted in Figure 15. The upper
image presents the raw acoustic signal recorded by a nearby
smartphone. The spectrogram in the lower image shows the
demodulated bits.
VIII. EVALUATION
In this section we provide an analysis and evaluation of the
acoustic waveforms generated through the power supply. We
also present the experimental setup and discuss the measure-
ments and results.
A. Measurements Setup
1) Transmitters: We examined the acoustic signal gener-
ated from six types of computers: three standard desktop
workstations (PC-1, PC-2, and PC-3), a server machine with
multi-core processors (Server), a small form factor computer
(NUK), and a low power embedded device (IOT). A detailed
list of the computers tested and their technical specifications
is provided in Table II.
2) Receiver: During the tests, the acoustic signals were
recorded with a Samsung Galaxy S7 (G930F) smartphone,
running the Android OS. The audio sampling was performed
using the smartphone’s internal microphone at a sampling rate
of 44.1kHz. We used the MathWorks MATLAB environment
for signal processing, and the Praat framework for additional
spectral analysis [53].
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Fig. 16: The sweep signal recorded from PC-1 (spectrogram
view)
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Fig. 17: The sweep signal recorded from NUK (spectrogram
view)
B. Spectral View
Power supplies are not intended to generate sound and hence
are limited in terms of the acoustic signal they can produce.
Unlike loudspeakers which can generate sound waves in the
entire spectrum of 0-24kHz, a good quality signal generated
from the PSU transformers and capacitors is only obtained at
certain fragmented bands of the spectrum. These ranges are
largely specific to each PSU, and dependent on their internal
design, structure, and the type of transformers and capacitors.
We examined the frequency bands of each of the six PSUs
by analyzing the chirp signal they generate. This signal, also
known as a sweep signal, is generated by gradually increasing
the switching frequencies of the PSU from the minimum to the
maximum in a specific range. In our case, we examined the
sweep signal in the band of 0-24kHz which can be received by
a nearby smartphone. For the analysis of the chirp signal, the
recording smartphone was located 20 cm away from the tested
device. Table III summarizes the analysis of the sweep signals
recorded from the six computers. It presents the frequency
TABLE II: The computers used in the experiments
# Type Model PSU CPU
PC-1 Desktop PC Silverstone FSP300-50HMN 300W Intel Core i7-4770 CPU@ 3.4GHz (4 cores)
PC-2 Desktop PC Infinity PK-450 450W Intel Core i7-4770 CPU 3.4GHz (4 cores)
PC-3 Desktop PC Lenovo ATX POWER SUPPLY 280 WATT Intel Core Quad-Q9550 CPU @2.83GHz (4 cores)
Server Server IBM DPS-750AB A 750Wx2 Intel Xeon CPUE5-2620 12 cores (24 threads)
NUK Small form factor Lenovo ThinkCentre PA-1650-72 20V 3.25A Intel Core i7 -4785T (4 cores)
IOT Embedded/IoT Raspberry Pi 3 DSA-13 PFC-05, 5V 2.5A Quad Core Broadcom BCM2837, 64-bit, ARMv8, processor Cortex A53
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Fig. 18: The sweep signal recorded from IOT (spectrogram
view)
band generated from each computer and an estimation of the
signal quality based on the SNR ranges measured from the
entire sweep signal.
TABLE III: The frequencies of the audible bands of for six
PSUs under test
# Best audible band Signal quality (SNR range)
PC-1 2300Hz - 22000Hz High (30-35dB)
PC-2 2200Hz - 22000Hz High (30-35dB)
PC-3 5491Hz - 6223Hz, 8300Hz - 9000HZ Low (20-30dB)
Server 8000Hz - 17000Hz Low (10-20dB)
NUK 1800Hz - 24000Hz High (30-40dB)
IOT 3100Hz - 24000Hz Intermediate (20-30dB)
The results show that the quality of the acoustic signal
may vary among different types of computers. PC-1 and
PC-2 generated a detectable signal in a band of 2300Hz-
22000Hz, while PC-3 could only generate a weak signal on
the fragmented bands of approximately 5500Hz-6220Hz and
8300Hz-9000Hz. The server computer generated a weak signal
in a band of 8000Hz-17000Hz. The NUK computer generated
a strong signal in the entire band of 1800Hz-24000Hz, and
the IOT generated a intermediate signal in a band of 3100Hz-
24000Hz. It is important to note that the strength of the signals
across the spectrum are not uniform; the signal may be strong
in certain frequency bands and weak in others. Based on the
results, we chose PC-1, NUK, and IOT for the reminder of the
evaluation. These computers produce strong signals, and they
represent the common cases of a PC workstation, small form
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Fig. 19: SNR levels measured at distances of 0-240cm
factor computer, and a low-power IoT device. The spectrogram
of their chirp signals can be seen in Figures 16, 17, and 18,
respectively.
C. Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)
The acoustic signals generated from the PSU transformers
and capacitors are limited in terms of strength. We measured
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) to compare the level of a
generated signal (S) to the level of the background noise
(N ) at different distances. This measure is correlated to the
quality of the audible signal, e.g., an S/N ratio greater than
one indicates there is more signal than noise. We generated a
signal for a time period of one second and compared it with
the background noise. For the SNR measurements, we used the
frequency band with the strongest signal for each PSU. The
signals were recorded with the smartphone receiver located
at distances of 0-250cm from the computer. The results are
presented in Figure 19.
As can be seen, the acoustic signal emanating from the IOT
device could be received from a distance of about 150cm with
an SNR of 10dB. With PC-1 and NUK, the good quality
signals could be received from a distance of 250cm with 22dB
and 17dB, respectively.
D. Number of Cores
As discussed, the number of cores used for signal generation
directly influences the strength (amplitude) of the signal (i.e.,
more transmitting threads yield a stronger signal). Figure 20
presents the SNR measurements of PC-1 with one, two, and
four cores used for signal generation. In this test, we used one
thread per core. The signal recorded at a distance of 20cm
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Fig. 20: SNR levels measured with 1 to 8 cores
from the computers showed a gradual increase as the number
of cores used for the signal generation increased (this ranged
from an SNR of 15dB with one core to an SNR of 27dB with
eight cores).
a) Hyper-Threading: Note that modern Intel CPUs sup-
port hyper-threading technology [54]. With this technology,
each physical core exposes two logical (virtual) cores to the
operating system. The CPU shares the workload between
the logical cores when possible for better utilization. In the
experiments, we bound the transmitting threads to the systems’
logical cores rather than the physical cores, i.e., in a system
with four physical cores and eight virtual cores we can
potentially run eight concurrent transmitting threads.
E. Bit-Error-Rate (BER)
As discussed in Section V-B, the acoustic signal can be
used for data transfer. We measured the bit error rate for PC-
1, NUK, and IOT at distances of 0-240cm for PC-1 and NUK
and 100cm for the IOT device. For the tests, we used B-
FSK modulation and the frequency band with the strongest
signal for each PSU. We transmitted sequences of random
bits, decoded them, and compared the results with the original
data. The tests were repeated three times. The results for PC-
1, NUK, and IOT are summarized in Tables IV, V, and VI,
respectively, as described below.
1) PC-1: With bit rWith bit rates of 1 bit/sec to 10
bit/sec we could maintain data transmission at distances of
240cm with a maximum BER of 5%.ate of 30 bit/sec we
could maintain data transmission at distances of 100cm with
a maximum BER of 10%. With bit rate of 60 bit/sec we
could maintain data transmission at distances of 60cm with
a maximum BER of 0%.
2) NUK: With bit rates of 1 bit/sec to 20 bit/sec we
could maintain data transmission at distances of 220cm with
a maximum BER of 5% and distances of 240cm with a
maximum BER of 8%. With a bit rate of 50 bit/sec we could
maintain data transmissions at distances of 100cm with a
maximum BER of 10%. With a bit rate of 60 bit/sec we could
1m
5mfiles, keylogging, 
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Fig. 21: The distances and relevant data for exfiltration
maintain data transmission at short distances of 20cm with a
maximum BER of 0%.
3) IOT: With bit rates of 1 bit/sec, 20 bit/sec, and 40 bit/sec,
we could maintain data transmission at distances of 100cm
with a maximum BER of 2-3%. With a bit rate of 80 bit/sec,
we could maintain data transmission at distances of 20cm with
a maximum BER of 10%.
F. Greater Distance
We found that some power supplies produce strong acoustic
signals in certain frequency bands. We were be able to receive
acoustic signals up to six meters away from PC-4. However,
the quality of the signal significantly decreases with the
distance. From 4m,5m and 6m away we were able to receive
the signals at maximal frequencies of 14kHz, 12kHz and
9kHz, respectively. Table VII shows the results of PC-4. With
bit rates of 5 bit/sec we could maintain data transmission at
distances of 6m away with a maximum BER of 1.2%.
G. Threat Radius
The above results indicates that the covert channel can
be used to transfer data with bit rates of 0-40 bit/sec at
short distances of 0-100cm. Such bit rates could be used to
transmit binary data, keystrokes logging, text files, and so on.
With slower bit rates of 1-10 bit/sec, the covert channel is
effective for even greater distances (200-300cm with PC-1 and
NUK, 200cm-600cm with PC-4). The slower bit rates could
be used to transfer a small amount of data, such as short texts,
encryption keys, passwords, and keystroke logging, as seen in
Figure 21.
H. Stealth
The transmitting code shown above requires no elevated
privileges and can be initiated from an ordinary user space
process. The code consists of basic CPU operations such as
busy loops, which do not expose malicious behavior, making
it highly evasive an unable to detect by static and dynamic
(runtime) malware detection solutions.
IX. COUNTERMEASURES
There are four main categories of countermeasures that
can be used to defend against the proposed covert channel:
zones separation, signal detection, signal jamming, and signal
blocking.
TABLE IV: Bit error rates (BER) for PC-1
# bps 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
PC-1 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5%
PC-1 10 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5%
PC-1 30 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 10% - - - - - - -
PC-1 60 0% 0% 0% 0% - - - - - - - - -
TABLE V: Bit error rates (BER) for NUK
# bps 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
NUK 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 8%
NUK 20 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% -
NUK 50 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 10% - - - - - - -
NUK 60 0% 0% - - - - - - - - - - -
TABLE VI: Bit error rates (BER) for IOT
# bps 0 20 40 60 80 100
IOT 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2%
IOT 20 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3%
IOT 40 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 3%
IOT 80 0% 10% - - - -
TABLE VII: Bit error rates (BER) for PC-4 with 5 bps
# 1m 2m 3m 4m 5m 6m
PC-4 0% 0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2%
a) Zoning: In procedural countermeasures the ’zoning’
approach may be used. In this approach sensitive computers
are kept in restricted areas in which mobile phones, micro-
phones, and electronic equipment are banned. The zoning ap-
proach (also referred to as ’red/black separation’) is discussed
in [55] as a means of handling various types of acoustic,
electromagnetic, and optical threats. However, zoning is not
always possible, due to practical limitations such as space and
cost. In our case, recording devices such as mobile phones
should be banned from the area of air-gapped systems or be
kept at a certain distance from them.
b) Signal Detection: Host based intrusion detection sys-
tems (HIDS) may continuously trace the activities of running
processes in order to detect suspicious behavior; in our case,
a group of threads that abnormally regulates the switching
frequency would be reported and inspected. Such a detection
approach would likely suffer from false alarms, since many
legitimate processes use CPU intensive calculations that affect
the processor’s workload [56]. Another problem in the runtime
detection approach is that the signal generation algorithm
(presented in Section V) involves only non-privileged CPU
instructions (e.g., busy loops). Monitoring non-privileged CPU
instructions at runtime necessitates that entering the monitored
processes enter a step-by-step mode, which severely degrades
performance [14]. Software based detection also suffers from
an inherent weakness in that it can easily be bypassed by
malware using evasion techniques [57]. In our case, the
malware may inject the transmitting threads into a legitimate,
trusted process to bypass the security mechanisms.
Hardware-based countermeasures may include noise de-
tector devices which monitor the spectrum at a range of
frequencies. Such products exist [58] but are prone to false
alarms due to natural environmental noises [56]. Jamming
the PSU signal by the generating background noise at a
specific ranges [59] is also possible but not applicable in some
environments, particularly in quiet settings. In our case, the
frequency band is 0-24kHz which is include the audible region.
c) Signal Jamming: Jamming the whole frequency band
will generate a noticeable amount of environmental noise
which may disturb users. Physical isolation in which the
computer chassis is built with special noise blocking cover
is also an option, but it is costly and impractical on a large-
scale. Carrara [45] suggested monitoring the audio channel for
abnormally energy peaks, in order to detect hidden transmis-
sions in the area. In our case, the ultrasonic frequency range
above 18kHz should be scanned (continuously) and analyzed.
However, as noted in [45], if the monitoring devuce is far from
the transmitter this approach may not be effective.
d) Signal Limiting/Blocking: Although there are quiet
PSUs that limit the acoustic noise emitted from their inter-
nal components, this feature does not hermetically prevent
the emission of noise [50]. Physical isolation in which the
computer chassis is enclosed within a special noise blocking
cover is also an option, but it is costly and impractical on a
large scale.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show that malware running on a computer
can use the power supply as an out-of-band speaker. A code
executed in the system can intentionally regulate the internal
switching frequency of the power supply, and hence control
the waveform generated from its capacitors and transformers.
This technique allows sonic and ultrasonic audio tones to be
generated from a various types of computers and devices even
when audio hardware is blocked, disabled, or not present.
We show that the POWER-SUPPLaY code can operate from
an ordinary user-mode process and doesn’t need hardware
access or root-privileges. This proposed method doesn’t invoke
special system calls or access hardware resources, and hence
is highly evasive. We present the implementation details and
evaluation, and provide the measurement results. By using
POWER-SUPPLaY, we could acoustically exfiltrated data
from audio-less systems to a nearby mobile phone at a distance
of 2.5 meters with a maximal bit rate of 50 bit/sec.
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